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WHAT A DUMP! THE CURRENT STATE OF ANTIDUMPING 
DUTY CALCULATIONS IN NON-MARKET ECONOMY CASES 
How does the administrating authority choose among possible third 
countries from which to obtain these prices? . . . The answer many 
respondents give is hard-bitten, perhaps cynical. They suggest in 
N[on-market economies] A[ntidumping] cases, an administering 
authority essentially is free to “make up the numbers.”1 
—Raj Bhala 
INTRODUCTION 
Currently, a debate rages at the World Trade Organization (WTO) between 
China on the one hand and the United States and the European Union on the 
other.2 It revolves around the latter two entities’ refusal to treat China as a 
market economy for the purposes of assessing an antidumping duty.3 An 
antidumping duty is a tariff applied to dumped products (i.e., products that 
have been sold in the importing country at less than their fair market value).4 
Normally when assessing such duties, a country simply charges the violating 
entity the difference between the product’s fair market value5 and the price at 
which it was first sold in the importing country.6 China is preoccupied with its 
status as a non-market economy (“NME”) because WTO members are allowed 
to calculate the antidumping duties owed on imports from NMEs using a 
different methodology that many consider to be, at best, “convoluted.”7 While 
 
 1  RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE 1044 
(LexisNexis 3d ed. 2008). 
 2  Request for Consultations by China, United States – Measures Related to Price Comparison 
Methodologies, WTO Doc. WT/DS515/1 (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
cases_e/ds515_e.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). 
 3  See, e.g., U.S. Set to Review China’s Market-Economy Status Bid, WSJ Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS 
(Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-30/u-s-set-to-review-china-s-market-
economy-status-bid-wsj-says; Douglas Bulloch, China Doesn’t Deserve its ‘Market Economy’ Status by WTO, 
FORBES (Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/douglasbulloch/2016/12/12/china-doesnt-deserve-its-
market-economy-status-by-wto/#37f635112d70. 
 4  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. VI, ¶ 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter GATT]. 
 5  19 U.S.C. § 1677(34)–(35) (2012). Instead of using the term “fair market value,” the statute refers to 
the price at which the product is first sold for consumption in the exporting country. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(a) 
(2012). 
 6  19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(34)–(35), 1677(a)(1)(B)(i). See also Technical Information on Antidumping, 
WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). 
 7  David Dodwell, Market Economy Debate Really About Anti-dumping Shenanigans, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST (Jan. 10, 2016), http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1899039/market-economy-debate-
really-about-antidumping-shenanigans; K. William Watson, It’s Time to Dump Nonmarket Economy 
Treatment, FREE TRADE BULL. NO. 65, 1 (Mar. 9, 2016). 
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arguments rage about what certain language in China’s 2000 Accession 
Agreement to the World Trade Organization means or whether China is 
actually a market economy, the reality, especially for purposes of the United 
States, is that China’s status as a NME is unlikely to change in the near future, 
and improvements to the convoluted methodology should at least be 
considered.8  
The history of custom duties extends back at least to the ancient 
Egyptians,9 but only relatively recently have countries imposed tariffs for the 
stated purpose of correcting unfair market distortions that undermine the 
general social welfare promoted by free trade.10 The General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created in 1947 for the express objective of 
substantially reducing tariffs and other trade barriers and eliminating 
preferences on a “reciprocal and mutually advantageous” basis;11 even so, it 
has always allowed for the levying of antidumping and countervailing duties.12 
Within eight years of the GATT’s creation, countries quickly realized the 
“special difficulties [that] may exist” in trying to assess such duties on imports 
from NME countries.13 Calculating the duty for dumped products is a difficult 
process even in the market economy context; doing so for products from 
NMEs adds another layer of complexity that substantially adds unpredictability 
to the process. The significance of these administrative problems explains why 
China is so concerned about its NME status. 
For NME antidumping duty determinations, the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (Commerce Department) is required to attempt to find a 
comparable price for the dumped product by examining data from a third 
country with a market economy.14 The lack of consistency or predictability in 
 
 8  Shawn Donnan, U.S. Seeks to Deny China Market Economy Status in WTO, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 
30, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/f7941646-d571-11e7-8c9a-d9c0a5c8d5c9; Matthew Bey, Invading 
China, One Trade Dispute at a Time, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2017/ 
01/17/invading-china-one-trade-dispute-at-a-time. 
 9  HIRONORI ASAKURA, WORLD HISTORY OF THE CUSTOMS AND TARIFFS 67 (World Customs Org. 
2003). 
 10  John J. Barceló III, A History of GATT Unfair Trade Remedy Law – Confusion of Purposes, 
CORNELL L. FAC. PUBLICATIONS 311, 311 (1991). 
 11  GATT, supra note 4, at pmbl.  
 12  Id. art. VI, ¶ 2. Article VI deals exclusively with antidumping and countervailing duties. It defines 
countervailing duties as “special dut[ies] levied for the purpose of offsetting any . . . subsidy bestowed, directly 
or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or exportation of any merchandise.” Id.  
 13  Id. Annex I, Addendum to Article VI, ¶ 1.2 (effectively defining non-market economy to mean “a 
country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices 
are fixed by the State”). 
 14  19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(C) (2012). 
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the Commerce Department’s attempts to establish such a surrogate country and 
determine a good’s fair market price has left many with the impression that the 
Commerce Department “makes it up as it goes.”15 It is well established that in 
large part “economic success . . . depend[s] on an efficient and predictable rule 
of law.”16 The lack of predictability in the Commerce Department’s work hurts 
both foreign and domestic producers.17 Foreign companies cannot know ahead 
of time how much they must pay, and domestic companies cannot know how 
saturated the market will be—a problem that makes it significantly more 
difficult for them to predict the sales prices for their goods.18 
This Comment first examines the Commerce Department’s process for 
assessing duties on dumped imports from NMEs to determine this method’s 
consistency. Finding problems with the Commerce Department’s results, this 
Comment argues that to reduce lawsuits and add a modicum of predictability 
to its determinations, the Commerce Department should adopt a more 
formulaic approach for selecting the best surrogate country. More specifically, 
Part I of this Comment provides not only the historical background of such 
duties, but also presents the economic theory underlying such duties. Part II 
lays out the basic state of antidumping duties in the United States in 2017, 
while Part III raises questions about the accuracy of the process for dealing 
with antidumping duties on imports from NMEs. Part IV examines how the 
Canadian antidumping duty regime deals with the surrogate country selection 
conundrum. Lastly, Part V presents a potential path forward for the Commerce 
Department to increase the predictability of their proceedings without unduly 
hampering their discretion.  
I. THE HISTORY OF AND THEORY BEHIND ANTIDUMPING AND 
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 
Custom duties trace their origins back to the gifts and bribes ancient 
merchants would give a king or chieftain for the right to trade within that 
 
 15  K. William Watson, Will Nonmarket Economy Methodology Go Quietly Into the Night?, 763 POL’Y 
ANALYSIS 1, 1, 4 (Oct. 28, 2014); see also Patricia Piskorski, A Dangerous Discretionary “Duty”, 34 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 598 (2005) (“The U.S. antidumping rubric is left open to criticism . . . because of its 
unpredictability and lack of accuracy.”). 
 16  Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the 2003 Financial Markets Conference of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Apr. 4, 2003), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/ 
2003/20030404/default.htm; see also THE AMERICAS SOC’Y & THE COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS, RULE OF LAW, 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 18 (2007) (“An environment in which the administration of justice . . . 
is more predictable . . . eases the constraints for expansion of . . . enterprises.”). 
 17  Watson, Will Nonmarket Economy Methodology Go Quietly Into the Night?, supra note 15, at 3–4. 
 18  Id.  
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sovereign’s territory.19 The adoption of mercantilism by the European powers 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries brought about a new rationale for 
the implementation of tariffs; sovereigns hoped tariffs would reduce imports 
and encourage exports, thereby encouraging the flow into the king’s coffers of 
money deriving from local production.20 Very early in its history, the United 
States recognized the detrimental impact another country’s export subsidies 
and dumping could have on a national economy.21 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
United States was the first country to enact what would now be considered a 
countervailing duty law when it passed the McKinley Tariff of 1890.22 The 
McKinley Tariff imposed an additional duty on sugar from countries paying 
“directly or indirectly, a bounty on the exportation” of certain kinds of sugar.23 
The first antidumping duty law came in 1904 when Canada created a “special 
duty of customs equal to the difference between [a product’s] fair market value 
and [its] selling price.”24 Even before that law passed, critics expressed 
concern over potential administrative problems.25 Nevertheless, countervailing 
and antidumping duties became fairly common within the tariff laws of the 
first half of the twentieth century and so were incorporated into the GATT in 
1947.26 
In theory, antidumping and countervailing duty laws exist to “prevent 
companies from establishing monopolies through the use of predatory 
pricing.”27 Even temporary or sporadic dumping can theoretically force local 
 
 19  ASAKURA, supra note 9, at 19, 46 (“[I]n ancient and medieval times Customs duty was primarily a 
means of raising revenue for the state or a royal family.”). 
 20  Id. at 189–94. 
 21  ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON MANUFACTURES, 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 989 (Dec. 1, 1791). In 
early 1790, Congress asked Alexander Hamilton to report on the subject of manufacturing and promotion of 
such. In his report, he noted that:  
the greatest obstacle of all to the successful prosecution of a new branch of industry in a country 
in which it was before unknown, consists . . . [of] the bounties premiums and other aids which are 
granted . . . by the nations, in which the establishments to be imitated are previously introduced. 
It is well known . . . that certain nations grant bounties on the exportation of particular 
commodities, to enable their own workmen to undersell and supplant all competitors, in the 
countries to which those commodities are sent. 
Id.  
 22  Barceló, supra note 10, at 321–23. 
 23  McKinley Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567, ¶ 237 (1890). 
 24  An Act to Amend the Customs Tariff, 1897, S.C. 1904 c. 11, § 19 (Can.). 
 25  LXVI OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS OF THE DOMINION OF 
CANADA, 9th Parliament, 4th Sess. 5742 (1904) (Thomas Birkett states, “I would like to point out how difficult 
it is going to be to carry out the antidumping clause.”). 
 26  See Barceló, supra note 10, at 314–15, 322–23. 
 27  Jean-Marc Leclerc, Reforming Antidumping Law: Balancing the Interests of Consumers and 
Domestic Industries, 44 MCGILL L.J. 111, 113 (1999). 
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producers to exit a market, which means the economy will have to bear the 
cost of retraining people or rebuilding facilities when the dumping inevitably 
ends.28 Dumping can also force people to change jobs, which can have an 
effect on the morale and efficiency of the community.29 Economic analyses 
have, at best, left unresolved whether the harm caused by dumping or export 
subsidies does in fact outweigh the benefit of cheaper goods; nevertheless, 
such law retains a central place in many countries’ trade policies.30 It is on this 
controversial theoretical basis that support for antidumping duties must rely 
before even bringing in practical administrative concerns. 
II. ANTIDUMPING DUTIES IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY 
For antidumping and countervailing duty purposes, U.S. law defines NMEs 
as those that, according to the Commerce Department, do “not operate on 
market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in 
such countr[ies] do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise.”31 Eleven 
countries are currently designated by the Commerce Department as NMEs,32 
but by far the most significant two are China and Vietnam.33 Every year, goods 
 
 28  Id. at 117. 
 29  Id. at 119. 
 30  Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L. L. & ECON. 1, 2, 11 (1995) 
(“Empirical evidence strongly suggests that this gain [to society in the form of lower prices] outweighs the cost 
to producers in the import country, measured by reduced profits, and to their employees, in terms of reduced 
employment.”). 
 31  19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A) (2012). 
 32  De Facto Criteria for Establishing a Separate Rate in Antidumping Proceedings Involving Non-
Market Economy Countries, 78 Fed. Reg. 40430, 40430 n.3 (July 5, 2013). The other nine NMEs are Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Once a 
country is determined to be a nonmarket economy, that determination remains in effect until revoked by the 
Commerce Department. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(C)(i) (“Any determination that a foreign country is a 
nonmarket economy shall remain in effect until revoked by the administering authority.”). The Commerce 
Department recently indicated that of these, at least Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and 
Turkmenistan are still considered nonmarket economies. See Int’l Trade Admin., Decision Memorandum for 
the Preliminary Affirmative Determination: Countervailing Duty Investigation of Truck and Bus Tires from 
the People’s Republic of China; and the Preliminary Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances in 
Part, at 21 (June 27, 2016), http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/prc/2016-15837-1.pdf. Certain imports from 
Belarus and Moldova are still the subject of antidumping duty orders. See Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel 
Wire Rod from Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Moldova, and Trinidad and Tobago: Continuation of Antidumping 
and Countervailing Duty Orders, 79 Fed. Reg. 38008 (July 3, 2014); Steel Concrete Reinforcing Bars from 
Belarus, Indonesia, Latvia, Moldova, Poland, the People’s Republic of China, and Ukraine: Continuation of 
Antidumping Duty Orders, 78 Fed. Reg. 43858 (July 22, 2013). 
 33  Although the list does not include Cuba, it would likely be added should the embargo be removed. 
When determining if a country is a non-market economy, the Commerce Department must consider, among 
other things, “(i) the extent to which the country’s currency is convertible into the currency of other countries, 
(ii) the extent to which wages are determined by free bargaining between labor and management . . . , (iv) the 
extent of government ownership or control of the means of production, [and] (v) the extent of government 
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from those two countries constitute approximately twenty-three percent of all 
imports into the United States.34 Of the 321 antidumping duty orders in place 
as of September 13, 2017, 120 involved products from China or Vietnam.35 
Almost one third of all import duties collected during 2014, 2015, and 2016 
were on imports from those two countries.36 
As noted above, one major complaint with the Commerce Department’s 
process for assessing antidumping duties on imports from NMEs is that neither 
foreign exporters nor the domestic industry can predict how large a tariff will 
be charged on products.37 “The U.S. antidumping rubric is left open to 
criticism . . . because of its unpredictability and lack of accuracy.”38 In 
particular, critics argue that “the use of nonmarket economy methodology 
harms domestic import-using businesses and consumers” because it “results in 
unpredictable and unrealistically high antidumping duties.”39 The inability to 
plan for the future creates significant difficulties for foreign producers and 
exporters, while American consumers have to pay higher prices. 
 
control over the allocation of resources and over the price and output decisions of enterprises . . . .” 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677(18)(B); see Day Zero or D-Day, THE ECONOMIST (May 16, 2015), https://www.economist.com/news/ 
americas/21651292-tricky-task-unifying-crazy-system-exchange-rates-day-zero-or-d-day; Double Trouble, 
THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2013/10/cubas-currency; 
CLAY BOGGS & GEOFF THALE, WASHINGTON OFFICE ON LATIN AMERICA, LABOR RIGHTS AND CUBA’S 
ECONOMIC REFORMS 2, 5 (Dec. 2013), https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Labor_Rights_and_Cubas_ 
Economic_Reforms.pdf; Karen DeYoung, In Cuba, Prosperity Will Require Changes to Government Control, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-cuba-prosperity-
will-require-changes-to-government-control/2015/02/14/71844fee-afe0-11e4-886b-c22184f27c35_story.html; 
Dudley Althaus, Cuba Moves to Legalize Small- and Medium-Size Businesses, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/cuba-moves-to-legalize-small-and-medium-size-businesses-1464132702; Sarah 
Marsh & Marc Frank, Cuba Says Economy Shrank This Year In Tandem with Venezuela Crisis, REUTERS 
(Dec. 27, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-economy/cuba-says-economy-shrank-this-year-in-
tandem-with-venezuela-crisis-idUSKBN14G1E0.  
 34  U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services: FT-900 Supplement, Exhibit 4 
(Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/trade/2017/pdf/trad1216.pdf (noting that for 
2016, the value of goods imported into the United States from China was equal to $462,813,000,000 and the 
value of imports from Vietnam was $42,109,200,000, while the total value of all imported goods was 
$2,188,940,600,000). 
 35  See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders in Place, https://www. 
usitc.gov/trade_remedy/documents/orders.xls (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). 
 36  See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb, https://dataweb.usitc.gov/ 
scripts/user_set.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2018) (noting that import duties on goods from China totaled $19.637 
billion in 2014, $20.84 billion in 2015, and $18.957 billion in 2016, and import duties on goods from Vietnam 
were $1.423 billion in 2014, $1.673 billion in 2015, and $1.662 billion in 2016, while overall the government 
collected $64.974 billion in import duties in 2014, $67.07 billion in 2015, and $62.349 billion in 2016). 
 37  Piskorski, supra note 15, at 598. 
 38  Id. 
 39  Watson, It’s Time to Dump Nonmarket Economy Treatment, supra note 7, at 1. 
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To properly understand the uncertainty companies face when dealing with 
exports from non-market economies, it is first necessary to understand the 
problems inherent to all antidumping duty calculations. Current U.S. 
antidumping (and countervailing duty) law comes from the Tariff Act of 1930, 
which Congress has substantively amended on numerous occasions.40 
Antidumping duty investigations may be initiated upon the request of a 
domestic industry,41 at which point the International Trade Commission must 
make an initial determination as to whether a domestic industry is being (or is 
threatened to be) injured.42 If that is the case, the Commerce Department 
preliminarily determines whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that 
merchandise is being sold at less than fair value.43 Broadly speaking, the 
Commerce Department makes this preliminary determination by calculating 
what the dumping margin for each exporter should be.44 The dumping margin 
is equal to the home market price of the product in question (the normal value) 
minus the price of the product when it was first sold in the United States (the 
export price).45 If the dumping margin is greater than zero, then the product 
was “dumped,”46 and the foreign exporter must pay an antidumping duty equal 
to the dumping margin.47 After making preliminary calculations, the 
Commerce Department takes comments from foreign exporters and the 
domestic industry and then recalculates everything to come up with a final 
determination for the dumping margin.48 
Although this is relatively simple in theory, in practice the process quickly 
becomes complicated. For instance, all foreign exporters of a particular 
product do not sell that product for the same price in the United States.49 
 
 40  19 U.S.C. §§ 1202–1683g (2012). The provisions dealing with antidumping and countervailing duties 
were last amended by the Trade Facilitation and Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–25, title IV, 
§§ 401–33, 130 Stat. 155–71 (Feb. 24, 2016). 
 41  19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1673a (2012) (for the language relevant to countervailing duties, see the 
equivalent language in §§ 1671–1671h); Bryan Johnson, A Guide to Antidumping Laws: America’s Unfair 
Trade Practice, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (July 21, 1992), http://www.heritage.org/trade/report/guide-
antidumping-laws-americas-unfair-trade-practice. Cf. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671–1671h (containing equivalent 
language relevant to countervailing duties).  
 42  19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a). 
 43  19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b). 
 44  19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d). 
 45  19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(34)–(35). In other words, dumping margin equals normal value minus export 
price. See id. 
 46  In reality, if the dumping margin is calculated to be less than two percent ad valorem, then the 
dumping margin is considered de minimis and no duty is imposed. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(3). 
 47  19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1673e(b)(1). 
 48  19 U.S.C. §§ 1673d(a), (c). 
 49  See, e.g., Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results of the 2009-2010 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 76375, 76381 (Dec. 7, 2011). 
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However, given that often up to sixty companies are subject to an 
investigation, calculating a dumping margin for every single exporter would be 
extremely time consuming for the Commerce Department.50 Consequently, the 
Tariff Act of 1930 allows the Commerce Department to select a few exporters, 
called mandatory respondents, and calculate each of their dumping margins.51 
The weighted average of those values is then used as the all-others rate (i.e., 
the dumping margin rate for all the exporters who weren’t examined 
individually).52 Although other exporters can request to be individually 
examined as voluntary respondents, the Commerce Department has wide 
discretion in taking on that additional burden.53 The Commerce Department 
has never promulgated regulations explaining how it chooses which companies 
will be mandatory respondents and so it is only bound by the broad language 
of the statute.54 Presumably for cost-saving reasons, the Commerce 
Department tends to choose only the two largest exporters and deny most 
applications to be a voluntary respondent.55 Problematically, though, numerous 
circumstances often force the Commerce Department to ultimately dismiss one 
or both of mandatory respondents’ numbers, meaning that vast swaths of 
exporters are given an all-others rate based entirely off of a single company’s 
 
 50  E.g., Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 949 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1267 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013) 
(noting that there were 159 companies under review). The Commerce Department once tried to argue that 
calculating an individual dumping margin for each of the only four exporters of the good was administratively 
burdensome enough to justify relying on the averaging method. Zhejiang Native Produce & Animal By-
Products Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 33 Ct. Int’l Trade 1125, 1128 (2009). 
 51  § 1677f–1(c)(2). Should a mandatory respondent’s dumping margin end up as de minimis, then that 
margin cannot be used for averaging purposes when calculating the all-others rate. 
 52  Id. 
 53  See, e.g., Shenzhen Xinboda Indus. Co. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1319 n.16 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2016) (“Commerce’s recent history evidences a questionable tendency not to accept any voluntary 
respondents.”); Longkou Haimeng Mach. Co. v. United States, 32 Ct. Int’l Trade 1142, 1151 (2008). Until 
recently, margins for voluntary respondents were not even included in the calculation of the all-others rate. 
MacLean-Fogg Co. v. United States, 753 F.3d 1237, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding 19 C.F.R. § 351.204(d)(3) 
invalid). 
 54  § 1677f–1(c)(2).  
If it is not practicable to make individual weighted average dumping margin determinations under 
paragraph (1) because of the large number of exporters or producers involved in the investigation or 
review, the administering authority may determine the weighted average dumping margins for a 
reasonable number of exporters or producers by limiting its examination to— 
 (A) a sample of exporters, producers, or types of products that is statistically valid based on the 
information available to the administering authority at the time of selection, or  
 (B) exporters and producers accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise from the 
exporting country that can be reasonably examined. 
 55  See, e.g., Shenzhen Xinboda, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 1322 n.22; Husteel Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 180 F. 
Supp. 3d 1330, 1334–35 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016). 
WILLIAMS GALLEYPROOFS 4/12/2018 12:04 PM 
2018] ANTIDUMPING DUTY CALCULATIONS 441 
numbers or even the previous year’s numbers.56 This leads to fairly large 
changes in a company’s dumping margin, not only from year to year, but also 
from initial determinations to final determinations to remand results.57 
III. NON-MARKET ECONOMY COMPLICATIONS 
On top of the framework described in Part II comes the additional 
“convoluted” methodology for dealing with exports from NMEs.58 The 
underlying premise for treating NMEs differently is that in such countries, 
“domestic sale prices are not market-determined but are instead set by central 
planners . . . [and so the prices] may bear no meaningful relationship . . . .” to 
the good’s actual value.59 With the home market’s prices unsuitable for 
providing a normal value, calculating the dumping margin for products from 
NMEs is exceedingly difficult; it requires the Commerce Department to 
somehow arrive at a surrogate value for the normal value.60 To create a 
surrogate value, the Commerce Department builds the price from the ground 
up.61 It takes the cost of the elements used in producing the merchandise and 
adds to that value various other amounts representing general expenses, profits, 
or the cost of containers and packaging.62 Of course, the Commerce 
Department cannot get those numbers directly from the non-market economy, 
so it must determine those quantities by looking to values from the surrogate 
country. The surrogate country itself must be “at a level of economic 
development comparable to that of the NME country, and significant producers 
of comparable merchandise.”63 Beyond that, the Commerce Department has no 
other statutory instructions telling it how to create this surrogate normal value; 
 
 56  An “all others rate” is the dumping rate assigned to exporters and producers not individually 
investigated. § 1673b(d)(1)(A)(ii). It is supposed to equal the weighted average of the individually investigated 
companies. § 1673d(c)(5). For examples of how the Commerce Department often excludes all the exporters 
individually investigated so that they have trouble calculating an “all others rate,” see Shenzhen Xinboda, 180 
F. Supp. 3d at 1322–24; Navneet Publ’ns (India) Ltd. v. United States, No. 13-00204, 2015 WL 1963768, at 
*3 (Ct. Int’l Trade May 4, 2015) (explaining how both individually investigated respondents had zero-percent 
rates). 
 57  See, e.g., Navneet Publ’ns, No. 13-00204, 2015 WL 1963768, at *1, *4 (Ct. Int’l Trade May 4, 2015) 
(demonstrating how the “all others rate” dropped from 11.01% to 0.5%); U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 179 
F. Supp. 3d 1114, 1119–20 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016) (“all others rate” changing from 55.29% to 5.79%). 
 58  19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c); IMP. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, POLICY BULLETIN 04.1 (Mar. 1, 
2004), http://enforcement.trade.gov/policy/bull04-1.html; Watson, It’s Time to Dump Nonmarket Economy 
Treatment, supra note 7, at 1. 
 59  Watson, Will Nonmarket Economy Methodology Go Quietly Into the Night?, supra note 15, at 7–8. 
 60  19 U.S. C.§ 1677b(c)(1)(B). 
 61  19 U.S.C. §§ 1677b(c)(1)(B), (c)(4). 
 62  19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1)(B); see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.408. 
 63  19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4). 
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the only other requirement is that the Commerce Department must base the 
valuation “on the best available information.”64  
The Commerce Department has promulgated regulations on the matter, 
which provide some additional guidelines.65 The regulations help clarify that 
economic comparability should be measured by GDP per capita, that the 
Commerce Department will normally favor using a single country to derive all 
the surrogate numbers it needs, and that the Commerce Department will favor 
using publicly available information to value the factors of production.66 
Representing the entirety of the Commerce Department’s direction, the 
statutory and regulatory framework still leaves the Commerce Department with 
a significant amount of discretion. 
To understand exactly how little guidance those provisions provide the 
practitioners at the Commerce Department who make those determinations, a 
simple hypothetical is helpful. Imagine it is 2014 and the International Trade 
Commission has preliminarily determined that the domestic honey industry is 
being threatened by the dumping of honey from Vietnam.67 The Commerce 
Department needs to establish a surrogate country that it can use to determine 
the cost of the factors of production (like hives, flowers, beekeeping suits, 
glass storage jars, etc.), the cost of labor, and the average profits of honey-
making companies. The Commerce Department thinks it will be able to find 




 64  § 1677b(c)(1)(B); see Shakeproof Assembly Components, Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. United 
States, 268 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“In determining the valuation of the factors of production, the 
critical question is whether the methodology used by Commerce is based on the best available information and 
establishes antidumping margins as accurately as possible.”). 
 65  19 C.F.R. § 351.408. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Although it is honey from China, not honey from Vietnam, that is actually subject to an antidumping 
duty order, it is one of the few products subject to such an order that is simple to understand. See Notice of 
Antidumping Duty Order and Amendment to Final Determination: Honey from the People’s Republic of 
China, 66 Fed. Reg. 59026, 59026 (Dec. 10, 2001). 
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TABLE 168 
Country Honey Production 
Gross National Income (GNI) 
per Capita 
(tonnes) (USD) 
India 61,945 1,560 
Tanzania 30,905 920 
Romania 18,040 9,600 
Vietnam 14,218 1,900 
Australia 13,198 64,860 
Poland 12,836 13,360 
Uzbekistan 8,751 2,110 
Egypt 5,443 3,250 
Pakistan 4,371 1,390 
Morocco 3,800 3,040 
Nicaragua 560 1,890 
How does the Commerce Department determine which country’s data to use? 
The surrogate country must be both economically comparable to Vietnam and 
a significant producer of honey, but what does that mean? Should it value 
economies of scale and start with the country most similar in production 
capacity to Vietnam and see if it is economically comparable? Or should the 
Commerce Department start by seeing if any of the most economically 
comparable countries produce significant amounts of honey? Imagine if it 
favors economic comparability. Should Nicaragua’s 560 tons of honey count 
as significant production? Does it matter that Nicaragua also produced 11,000 
tons of a red dye made from a process extremely similar to that used to 
produce honey? What if Moroccan honey is not edible but rather almost solid 
and used only for medical purposes? What if the information on the cost of 
beekeeper suits and glass bottles in Pakistan comes from a website entitled 
“Aliens ARE AMOng uS!?!?!!” or, more realistically, cannot be easily 
authenticated because it comes from a website that is only in Urdu or Pashto? 
 
 68  These are a selection of countries that at first glance might seem to have similar numbers to Vietnam. 
Honey production information comes from FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QL (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). For the GNI per capita information, see 
GNI per Capita Ranking Atlas Method (Current US$), WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 
NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?end=2015&name_desc=false&start=2014 (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). 
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What if Turkmenistan is dumping glass bottles into India and thereby 
artificially reducing the price there for that factor of production?  
The Commerce Department has set out its policy for approaching such 
questions.69 According to Policy Bulletin 04.1, the process begins with the 
creation of a list of market economy countries economically comparable to the 
NME.70 The Commerce Department then determines which of those countries 
are producers of comparable merchandise.71 It notes that, while “identical 
merchandise . . . qualifies as . . . comparable merchandise,” what other 
merchandise counts as comparable “is best determined on a case-by-case 
basis.”72  
Next, the Commerce Department judges which of the countries are in fact 
significant producers of that comparable merchandise.73 What counts as 
significant production is to be judged according to the “characteristics of [the] 
world production of, and trade in, comparable merchandise.”74 Often, 
“significant producer” means “significant net exporter,” but “the standard for 
‘significant producer’ will vary from case to case,”75 and therefore, “[b]ecause 
the meaning of ‘significant producer’ can differ significantly from case to case, 
fixed standards . . . have not been adopted.”76  
Finally, if necessary, the Commerce Department selects from the 
remaining countries the one whose data are best according to five 
considerations.77 Notably, in this process, the Commerce Department does not 
give extra weight to a country that is more economically comparable or more 
significant of a producer.78 The Commerce Department concludes the Policy 
Bulletin by pointing out that there will be exceptions when this particular 
sequential process is not appropriate and when it would be better “to address 
economic comparability only after the significant producer of comparable 
merchandise requirement is met.”79 In laying out this policy, the Commerce 
 
 69  POLICY BULLETIN 04.1, supra note 58. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id. (The five considerations are: (1) does the data represent period wide price averages; (2) are the 
prices provided specific to the input in question; (3) are the prices the net of taxes and import duties; (4) are the 
prices contemporaneous with the period of review; and (5) are the data publicly available?). 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. 
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Department chose to preserve its discretion rather than to bring more 
consistency and predictability to its work. 
Companies have an extremely difficult time trying to predict the duties 
they will owe,80 a problem exemplified by the importation of fresh garlic from 
China.81 Fresh garlic from China has been subject to an antidumping duty 
order since 1994 and offers a good insight into how duties can fluctuate over 
time for any number of reasons.82 Over the last decade, the calculated separate 
rate dumping margin83 has swung significantly not only from year to year, but 
also from each year’s preliminary determination to the year’s ultimate 
determination. This strongly indicates that adding up the costs of the inputs 
needed to produce the product in a third country is simply not a reliable way to 













13th Nov. 06–Oct. 07 Preliminary84 India $0.10 
13th Nov. 06–Oct. 07 Final85 India $1.03 
14th Nov. 07–Oct. 08 Preliminary86 N/A $1.03  
 
 80  Alan Luberda, Supply Chain Basics: Thirteen Things Every Importer Should Know About Risks 
Involved with Sourcing Products Subject to AD/CVD Orders, THOMPSON REUTERS: TAX & ACCT., Feb. 2014, 
at 15. 
 81  See Antidumping Duty Order; Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China, 59 Fed. Reg. 
59209, 59210 (Nov. 16, 1994). 
 82  See id. 
 83  The separate rate dumping margin is simply the “all others rate” discussed above, supra note 56, but 
in the NME context. Amanda Foods (Vietnam) Ltd. v. United States, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1379 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2009).  
 84  Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results of the Antidumping Duty 
Administrative and New Shipper Reviews and Intent to Rescind, In Part, the Antidumping Duty 
Administrative and New Shipper Reviews, 73 Fed. Reg. 74462, 74468 (Dec. 8, 2008). The dumping margin 
was given as a percentage (7.07%), but given how the percentage 72.74% equated to $1.03 in the final review, 
the preliminary dumping margin rate of 7.07% would be equal to $0.10.  
 85  Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Final Results and Partial Rescission of the 13th 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and New Shipper Reviews, 74 Fed. Reg. 29174, 29176 (June 19, 
2009). The dumping margin was given as a percentage (72.74%), but the fourteenth administrative review 
used the same dumping margin. Infra note 87.  
 86  Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results of, and Intent to Rescind, in 
Part, the Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 74 Fed. Reg. 64677, 64684 (Dec. 8, 2009) [hereinafter 
Preliminary Results AR 14]. 
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14th Nov. 07–Oct. 08 Final87 N/A $1.03  
15th Nov. 08–Oct. 09 Preliminary88 India $0.72  
15th Nov. 08–Oct. 09 Final89 India $0.06  
15th Nov. 08–Oct. 09 1st Remand Results90 India $0.02  
16th Nov. 09–Oct. 10 Preliminary91 India $0.48  
16th Nov. 09–Oct. 10 Final92 India $0.41  
17th Nov. 10–Oct. 11 Preliminary93 Ukraine $1.81  
17th Nov. 10–Oct. 11 Final94 N/A $1.28  
18th Nov. 11–Oct. 12 Preliminary95 Philippines $1.47  
18th Nov. 11–Oct. 12 Final96 Philippines $1.82  
18th Nov. 11–Oct. 12 1st Remand Results97 Philippines $1.82  
18th Nov. 11–Oct. 12 
2nd Remand 
Results98 Ukraine $2.19  
 
 87  Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Finals Results and Partial Rescission of the 14th 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 75 Fed. Reg. 34976, 34976 (June 21, 2010). 
 88  Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results of, Partial Rescission of, and 
Intent to Rescind in Part, the 15th Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 75 Fed. Reg. 80458, 80467 
(Dec. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Preliminary Results AR 15]. 
 89  Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand, Shenzhen Xinboda Indus. Co. v. United 
States, No. 11-00267, at 1 (Ct. Int’l Trade Apr. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Final Remand Results AR 15] (noting 
that the Commerce Department revised Xinboda’s rate downward from $0.06 per kilogram to $0.02 per 
kilogram). 
 90  Id. The separate rate entities did not object to the Final Results, but if they had, their rate would have 
gone down as well because for AR 15, the separate rate was just equal to Xinboda’s rate. See Preliminary 
Results AR 15, supra note 88, at 80465. 
 91  Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results of the 2009-2010 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 76375, 76382 (Dec. 7, 2011). 
 92  Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Final Results of the 2009-2010 Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review, 77 Fed. Reg. 34346, 34348 (June 11, 2012). 
 93  Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results of the 2010-2011 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 77 Fed. Reg. 73980, 73981 (Dec. 12, 2012). 
 94  Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Final Results of the 2010-2011 Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review, 78 Fed. Reg. 36168, 36169 (June 17, 2013) [hereinafter Final Results AR 17]. 
 95  Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results and Partial Rescission of the 
18th Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2011-2012, 78 Fed. Reg. 77653, 77654 (Dec. 24, 2013). 
 96  Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Finals Results and Partial Rescission of the 18th 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2011-2012, 79 Fed. Reg. 36721, 36723 (June 30, 2014). 
 97  Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Remand: Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of 
China, at 2, 24, Fresh Garlic Producers Ass’n v. United States, No. 14-00180 (Ct. Int’l Trade Feb. 9, 2016). 
 98  THOMAS GILGUNN, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., DRAFT RESULTS OF REDETERMINATION PURSUANT TO 
REMAND: FRESH GARLIC FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 18 (2016). 
WILLIAMS GALLEYPROOFS 4/12/2018 12:04 PM 
2018] ANTIDUMPING DUTY CALCULATIONS 447 
19th Nov. 12–Oct. 13 Preliminary99 N/A $1.82  
19th Nov. 12–Oct. 13 Final100 N/A $1.82  
20th Nov. 13–Oct. 14 Preliminary101 Romania $2.72  
20th Nov. 13–Oct. 14 Final102 Romania $2.75  
 
Average Separate Rate Margin Actually Applied103 
 
$1.36  
Among the administrative reviews covering imports from November 2006 
through October 2014, the Commerce Department twice determined from the 
outset that it lacked enough information to calculate a new separate entity 
dumping margin.104 Thus, for the 14th and 19th reviews, the margins in the 
preliminary determinations equaled those of the final determinations because 
the Commerce Department assigned separate companies the rate from the 
previous year.105 However, even including those two reviews, the average per 
kilogram change from one year to the next was $0.56.106 The average 
difference between each review’s preliminary and ultimate dumping margins 
was $0.42 per kilogram, while the average ultimate separate rate dumping 
margins for those years was only $1.36.107 To place those numbers into 
 
 99  Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results of the 19th Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review; 2012-2013, 79 Fed. Reg. 72625, 72627 (Dec. 9, 2014) [hereinafter Preliminary 
Results AR 19]. 
 100  Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Final Results and Partial Rescission of the 19th 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2012-2013, 80 Fed. Reg. 34141, 34142 (June 15, 2015). Because 
the Commerce Department did not want to calculate a separate rate, it is based on the previous review and will 
almost certainly change to match the ending rate of the 18th review. 
 101  Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Results, Preliminary Intent to Rescind 
and Partial Rescission of the 20th Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2013-2014, 80 Fed. Reg. 75972, 
75974 (Dec. 7, 2015). 
 102  Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Final Results and Final Rescission of the 20th 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; 2013-2014, 80 Fed. Reg. 39897, 39898 (June 20, 2016). 
 103  This is the unweighted average. Creating a weighted average is not possible because the amount each 
shipper imports is kept confidential and not every shipper receives a separate rate. YURI STARIKOV, 
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES: SEPARATE RATE 13 (New York Law School Center for International Law, 2011). 
This number also rests on three assumptions: 1) the department’s appeal of the court’s decision regarding the 
eighteenth administrative review will fail; 2) the ultimate dumping margin for the nineteenth administrative 
review will in fact end up being $2.19; and 3) the challenge to the twentieth administrative review’s 
calculations will fail. Id. 
 104  Preliminary Results AR 14, supra note 86, at 34978; Preliminary Results AR 19, supra note 99, at 
72626.  
 105  Preliminary Results AR 14, supra note 86, at 34979; Preliminary Results AR 19, supra note 99, at 
72625. 
 106  Again, this calculation assumes the ultimate rate for the 19th administrative review will be $2.19. 
 107  Again, this calculation assumes the ultimate rate for the 19th administrative review will be $2.19. 
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context, the average year-end price of fresh garlic in the United States over this 
time was approximately $1.25 per kilogram.108 
Many factors in these analyses are interdependent—for example, the price 
of garlic in the United States, the costs of production of garlic in both China 
and the United States, the export price of Chinese garlic, and the dumping 
margin assigned to Chinese garlic imports all depend on each other. Therefore, 
using them to make assumptions about each other can be difficult. That being 
said, the data still suggest something is wrong. Theoretically, two formulas 
should be true. The first formula is a restatement of the definition of a dumping 
margin—the production cost of garlic in China minus the export price equals 
the dumping margin. The second states the idea that the total value of garlic in 
the United States must equal the price at which Chinese garlic is sold, times the 
amount of Chinese garlic sold, plus the price at which all the other garlic in the 
United States was sold, times the amount of that garlic. Thus, for the 2007–
2014 time period described by the variables in the Table 3, those two equations 
can be stated as:  
  
 
 108  U.S. Garlic Price Received, YCHARTS, https://ycharts.com/indicators/us_garlic_price_received (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2018) (looking at the year-end prices for 2007–14). 
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CPC - PE = DM109 
& 
(AC * PE) + (AA * PU) = PA * (AC + AA) 
 
TABLE 3 
Variable Symbol Value 
Cost of Producing Garlic in China CPC 
Export Price PE 
Dumping Margin DM $1.3625 / kg110 




Amount of Garlic in the USA not 
Originating from China 
AA 
1,502,208 tonnes112 
Price Non-Chinese Garlic is Sold in the 
USA 
PU 
Cost of Producing Garlic in the USA CPU 
Average Price of Garlic PA $1.254 / kg113 
Assuming that U.S. producers were not selling their garlic at a loss for 
eight years, then, at the very least, CPU (the cost of producing garlic in the 
United States) must equal PU (the price of non-Chinese garlic sold in the 
United States).114 Under that assumption and plugging in the known numbers, 
unless China was selling the garlic for more than an eighty-percent loss—not 
even including the cost of the antidumping duties—for the entire eight year 
 
 109  Not all imported Chinese garlic had the same dumping margin (or export price). Given that the 
largest exporters were thrice assessed a dumping margin of $0.00 during this time period, the true average 
dumping margin for all imports might be lower. Conversely, given that garlic imports from state-run 
companies come with a $4.71 duty, it’s possible that the true average is higher. The separate rate suffices as an 
approximation of the average in the absence of other information. See also Leigh Kamping-Carder, ITA 
Maintains 4.71% Duties on Chinese Garlic, LAW360 (June 22, 2010), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
176483/ita-maintains-4-71-duties-on-chinese-garlic. 
 110  See supra note 107. 
 111  See supra note 36. 
 112  See id; FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 68. Total Amount of Garlic in the 
United States equals Amount Produced in the United States, plus Total Amount Imported, minus Total 
Amount Imported from China, minus Amount Exported equals 1,463,920, plus 628,011, minus 526,813, minus 
62,910 equals 1,502,208. 
 113  See supra note 108. 
 114  One would actually expect that CPU < PU. 
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period (so that PE < $0.24), then the cost of producing garlic in China was 
greater than the cost of producing garlic in the United States.115 This seems 
highly unlikely.116 The more likely explanation is that the Commerce 
Department’s unpredictable method for calculating the CPC (the cost of 
producing garlic in China) and subsequently the DM (“dumping margin”), 
from surrogate values, yielded unreliable results. 
This unpredictability is most clearly seen in the 15th, 17th, and 18th 
reviews. In the preliminary determination for the 15th administrative review, 
which covered most of 2009, the Commerce Department used surrogate values 
from India when calculating the factors of production.117 It therefore initially 
determined the separate rate dumping margin to be $0.72 per kilogram.118 
However, before issuing its final determination, the Commerce Department 
was persuaded to switch from using a generic wholesale price index to a garlic 
specific price index and to use more recent records when looking at an Indian 
company to see what appropriate financial ratios were for similar businesses.119 
These two changes, among others, caused the ultimate dumping margin for the 
15th administrative review to plummet to $0.02.120 
In the 17th administrative review, the Commerce Department initially used 
Ukraine as the surrogate and came up with a dumping margin of $1.81 per 
kilogram for the separate rate entities.121 Before issuing its final determination, 
the Commerce Department was persuaded that the database it used to 
determine the price of garlic bulbs in Ukraine was unreliable and switched to a 
 
 115  To determine at what point CPC = CPU, we can rewrite the dumping margin formula so that PU - PE = 
DM. Plugging in the $1.36 for the DM, we can rewrite PU in terms of PE: PU = 1.36 + PE. Plugging that into the 
other equation produces (AA * (1.36*PE) = PA * (AC + AA) - (AC * PE)). Filling in the other known factors 
from Table 3 yields the equation 1,502,208 * (1.36 + PE = {[1.25 * (526,813 + 1,502,208)] – (526,813 * PE)}). 
Changing the assumptions leads to equally questionable results. For example, let’s say that, in reality, China is 
selling their garlic at a fifty-percent loss. In that case, CPC = $2.72 and PE = $1.36. Thus, PU = {[1.25 * 
(526,813 + 1,502,208)] – (526,813 * 1.36)} / 1,502,208 = $1.21 = CPU. This means that the cost of production 
of garlic in China ($2.72) was more than 120% greater than the cost of garlic production in the United States 
($1.21).  
 116  JOANNA BONARRIVA, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, CHINA’S AGRIC. TRADE: COMPETITIVE 
CONDITIONS AND EFFECTS ON U.S. EXPS., App’x D-3 (Mar. 2011) (noting that an American trade association 
explicitly “stated that Chinese dehy[drated] garlic has a competitive advantage over U.S.-produced 
dehy[drated] garlic in all markets because of lower production costs.”). 
 117  Preliminary Results AR 15, supra note 88, at 80462. 
 118  Id. at 80467. 
 119  Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China: Final Results and Partial Rescission, in Part, of the 
2008-2009 Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 37321, 37323 (June 27, 2011). 
 120  Final Remand Results AR 15, supra note 89, at 1. 
 121  DAVID LINDGREN, IMP. ADMIN., ADMIN. REVIEW OF THE ANTIDUMPING DUTY ORDER ON FRESH 
GARLIC FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: SURROGATE VALUES FOR THE PRELIMINARY RESULTS 1 
(Dec. 3, 2012). 
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different Ukrainian database. This caused the mandatory respondents’ dumping 
margins to effectively become $0.00.122 Prohibited by law from using de 
minimis margins to calculate the separate rate, the Commerce Department 
exercised its statutory prerogative to “use any reasonable method” and chose 
the $1.28 dumping margin from a new-shipper review two years earlier—still 
based on Indian data.123 
In the 18th review, the Commerce Department selected the Philippines as 
the surrogate country and arrived at a preliminary dumping margin of $1.47 for 
separate rate entities.124 The Commerce Department chose the Philippines even 
though that country produced only 9,056 metric tons of fresh garlic during the 
year in question, which was less than 0.04% of the worldwide production; 
consequently, an importer challenged the Commerce Department’s 
determination that the Philippines was a significant producer of fresh garlic.125 
The Commerce Department insisted that it could define “significant” as 
“noticeably or measurably large” and that Policy Bulletin 04.1 expressly chose 
not to assign a minimum number or percentage to what could be considered 
significant.126 The Court of International Trade rejected the Commerce 
Department’s argument, noting that Policy Bulletin 04.1 indicates that the 
Commerce Department should judge whether production is significant by 
looking to the “characteristics of world production.”127 The Court held the 
Commerce Department’s decision to be in error because its definition 
“involved no comparative analysis” whatsoever.128 After having its first 
remand results—noting that the Philippines was forty-third out of ninety-five 
garlic producing countries—struck down, the Commerce Department 
reluctantly settled on Ukraine as the surrogate country in the second remand 
results.129 This change, along with the determination that one of the mandatory 
respondents had not been fully cooperative, raised the ultimate separate rate 
dumping margin to $2.16.130  
During this review, one respondent kept noting that Thailand produced 
eight times more garlic than the Philippines and, after India, was the “second 
 
 122  Final Results AR 17, supra note 94, at 36169. 
 123  Id. 
 124  Fresh Garlic Producers Ass’n v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1317 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015). 
 125  Id. at 1339. 
 126  Fresh Garlic Producers Ass’n v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1238 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016). 
 127  Id. 
 128  Fresh Garlic Producers Ass’n, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 1340. 
 129  GILGUNN, supra note 98, at 18. 
 130  Id. 
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most significant producer [on the] record.”131 The respondent urged the 
Commerce Department to “properly weigh the relative [in]significance of the 
Philippines’s garlic production.”132 The Commerce Department responded by 
essentially arguing that even when looking for a surrogate for the largest 
producer of garlic, greater production does not make a country a better 
surrogate. It correctly noted that the respondent “misreads section 773(c) [of] 
the Act; the criterion is significant production, not the most production. 
Consequently, not being the greatest producer of garlic does not preclude a 
country from being a significant producer.”133 Thus, the Commerce 
Department refused in this case to select Thailand over the Philippines simply 
because Thailand had greater production. This decision conforms with Policy 
Bulletin 04.1 when it states that “the Statute does not require that the 
Department use a surrogate country that is the most significant producer” and 
“the extent to which a country is a significant producer should not be judged 
against . . . the comparative production of the” other economically comparable 
countries.134  
Considering the Commerce Department’s reluctance in that administrative 
review of fresh garlic to look at significant production in terms of larger or 
smaller producers, the Commerce Department’s rationale for choosing 
Thailand as the surrogate country in Calgon Carbon Corp. seems confusing at 
first.135 Calgon dealt with an appeal of a dumping margin calculation for the 
antidumping duty on certain activated carbon products from China.136 For its 
preliminary determination, the Commerce Department chose the Philippines as 
the primary surrogate country and found the separate rate dumping margin to 
be $3.13 per kilogram.137 A party challenged that the merchandise being used 
to calculate the primary factor of production was not actually comparable.138 
For its final determination, the Commerce Department accepted that party’s 
 
 131  Brief for Shenzhen Xinboda Indus. Co. at 29, Fresh Garlic from the People’s Republic of China, Case 
No. A-570-831 - Annual Review, Review Period: November 1, 2011 through October 31, 2012 (May 14, 
2014). 
 132  Id. at 36. 
 133  U.S. DEPT. OF COM., INT’L TRADE ADMIN., A-570-831, ISSUES AND DECISION MEMORANDUM FOR 
THE FINAL RESULTS OF THE ANTIDUMPING DUTY ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW: FRESH GARLIC FROM THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 2011-2012 ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 8 (2013). 
 134  POLICY BULLETIN 04.1, supra note 58. 
 135  Calgon Carbon Corp. v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1240–42 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016). 
 136  Id. at 1224. 
 137  Id. at 1227. 
 138  By far the biggest factor of production is anthracite coal. Id. (citing Final Results of Redetermination 
Pursuant to Ct. Order, ECF Nos. 97-1 (conf. version) & 98-1 (pub. version) at 32–33). The party complained 
that 2013 Philippines reports, unlike any other countries’ figures, included filtration anthracite within the 
category of anthracite coal. Calgon Carbon Corp., 145 F. Supp. 3d at 1318. 
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arguments about the contemporaneous Philippines data and used the previous 
year’s Philippines data.139 This change produced a dumping margin of 
$0.04.140 The Court of International Trade found the Commerce Department 
failed to convincingly explain its preference for the previous year’s Philippine 
data over contemporaneous data from at least five other countries.141 Upon 
remand, the Commerce Department chose to use Thai data, which produced a 
dumping margin of $0.52.142  
In these remand results the Commerce Department explained how it ended 
up with Thailand as the surrogate country instead of South Africa or 
Ukraine.143 It chose Thailand over the other options, “based on which 
[potential] surrogate country is the most significant producer of comparable 
merchandise.”144 The Commerce Department made this decision at the same 
time it was explaining its rejection of Thai data in Fresh Garlic with the 
justification that “the criterion is significant production, not the most 
production.”145 This contradiction is technically justifiable because of the 
difference in circumstances between the two calculations. Unlike in Fresh 
Garlic, the Commerce Department in Calgon decided to go with the largest 
producer only after first going through the entire sequential analysis and 
determining that three economically comparable countries who were 
significant producers all had equally reliable data sets.146 That the Commerce 
Department would have found the data sets equally reliable in Calgon but not 
so in Fresh Garlic exemplifies how unpredictable the Commerce Department’s 
process often is.  
 
 
 139  Although the Commerce Department agreed, rather than switching to another country, it decided to 
use the 2012 Philippines report, which no party had challenged in the previous year’s review. Calgon Carbon 
Corp., 145 F. Supp. 3d at 1318–19. If the Commerce Department had reason to think why the 2012 Philippines 
report did not also have a broader definition of anthracite coal, the Commerce Department declined to state 
what it was, and instead seemed to have relied on the fact that the parties had waived their right to complain 
about its accuracy. Calgon Carbon Corp, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 1227–28. 
 140  Calgon Carbon Corp, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 1228. 
 141  Id. at 1233–34. 
 142  Id. at 1228–29. 
 143  Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand at 15, Calgon Carbon Corp., 190 F. 
Supp. 3d 1224 (No. 14-00326). 
 144  Id. at 15–16 
 145  See U.S. DEPT. OF COM., INT’L TRADE ADMIN., A-570-831, supra note 133, at 8. 
 146  Compare Calgon Carbon Corp., 190 F. Supp. 3d at 1228–29, with Fresh Garlic Producers Ass’n v. 
United States, 180 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1243 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016). 
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IV. ANTIDUMPING DUTY CALCULATIONS IN CANADA 
The Commerce Department is not alone among the administering agencies 
of antidumping measures to use a questionable method. Canadian unfair trade 
remedy law is laid out in the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA).147 Because 
it is also based on GATT Article VI, the substance of SIMA differs very little 
from that of the Tariff Act of 1930. The dumping margin assigned is equal to 
the normal value minus the export price of the goods.148 In the context of non-
market economies,149 the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) usually 
determines the normal value of the good by finding “the aggregate of the cost 
of production of [a] like good[], a reasonable amount for administrative, selling 
and all other costs, and a reasonable amount for profits.”150 These values are 
found in the same way they are in the United States—by looking to another 
country. This surrogate country can be “any country other than Canada 
designated by the President” of CBSA.151 Furthermore, as with the Commerce 
Department in the United States, there exists very little substantive statutory or 
regulatory guidance for how the CBSA should choose the surrogate country152 
or how it should use the factors of production, costs, and profit numbers to 
create a surrogate value.153 
Canadian law and practice does differ from that of the United States in two 
crucial ways. First, rather than require that respondents and petitioners provide 
data from a list of potential surrogate countries, the CBSA simply sends out a 
request for information to producers of other countries.154 Unsurprisingly, 
 
 147  Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-15 (Can.). 
 148  Id. c 30.2(1)–(2). 
 149  SIMA does not use the precise term “nonmarket economy country,” instead referring more to export 
monopolies. See id. c 20(1). However, the situations for when the special procedures come in are quite similar. 
Compare id. c 20(1)(a) (referring to a country “where . . . domestic prices are substantially determined by the 
government of that country and there is sufficient reason to believe that they are not substantially the same as 
they would be if they were determined in a competitive market”), with 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(a) (2015) 
(referring to a country that “does not operate on market principles of cost or pricing . . . so that sales of 
merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value of the merchandise”). 
 150  Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-15, s 20(1)(c)(ii) (Can.). 
 151  Id. c 20(1)(c). 
 152  Technically, in certain circumstances, the CBSA’s discretion is limited by a prohibition against 
choosing a country where the like good, in the opinion of the CBSA, is itself being dumped or whose price has 
been influenced by a non-market economy. See Special Import Measures Regulations, SOR/84-927 17.1 
(Can.). 
 153  Id. c 14-17.2.  
 154  See, e.g., CAN. BORDER SERV. AGENCY, 4214-31JAD/1390, Statement of Reasons, Certain PUP 
Joints Originating in or Exported from the People’s Republic of China, at ¶ 102-03 (2012) (Can.), 
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/ad1390/ad1390-i11-fd-eng.pdf. 
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these requests rarely produce viable information.155 Once this happens, the 
CBSA’s president can simply choose any country he or she wants.156 This 
discretion is magnified by the absence in Canadian law of the requirement that 
the valuation be “based on the best available information.”157 Thus, the 
Canadian government actually has significantly more discretion than the 
Commerce Department in how to select a surrogate country. As the Federal 
Court of Appeal noted in a 2006 case,  
The questions of whether the President . . . properly calculated the 
margins of dumping draw on the President’s expertise in 
international trade matters. These issues are technical and the statute 
[in establishing the factors of production method] . . . confers some 
discretion on the President. Were courts to become mired in all the 
minutia of detail informing a margin of dumping calculation, it is 
sure that they would not see the light of the day beneath the volumes 
of evidence that would assuredly be produced—as they were in this 
case—on judicial review. This factor points to more, and 
considerable, deference.158  
Given the CBSA’s administrative flexibility, companies have always been 
extremely hesitant to challenge CBSA’s determination of a dumping margin.159 
This does not necessarily mean, though, that Canadian determinations are more 
accurate or even are more predictable in arriving at a surrogate country. 
Unfortunately, the CBSA does not publicly release the value of the 
antidumping duties it assesses. A joint study between the Commerce 
Department and the CBSA would shed additional light on the reliability of 
NME calculations more generally. Given China’s dominance of the market and 
the obvious proximity of Canada to the United States, the antidumping duty 
assessed by Canadians and that assessed by Americans for the same product 
 
 155  Id.; CAN. BORDER SERV. AGENCY, 4214-22 AD/1379, Statement of Reasons, Certain Aluminum 
Extrusions Originating in or Exported from the People’s Republic of China, at ¶ 32 (2009) (Can.), 
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/ad1379/ad1379-i08-fd-eng.pdf; CAN. BORDER SERV. AGENCY, 4214-
22 AD/1379, Statement of Reasons, Certain Aluminum Extrusions Originating in or Exported from the 
People’s Republic of China, at ¶ 94 (2008) (Can.), http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/ad1379/ad1379-
i08-pd-eng.html. 
 156  Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c S-15, s 20(1)(d)(1) (Can.). 
 157 See Shakeproof Assembly Components, Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. United States, 268 F.3d 1376, 
1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 158  Uniboard Surfaces Inc. v. Kronotex Fussboden GmbH & Co. KG, [2006] FCA 398, para. 60 (Can. 
Fed. Ct. App.). 
 159  Cf. ANDREW M. LANOUETTE & CHRISTOPHER KENT, CANADA: HIGH DEFERENCE, STARK REALITY 29 
(Müslüm Yilmaz ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2013) (noting that in the nineteen years between 1994 and 2013, 
only eight challenges to a dumping margin made it up to the Federal Court of Appeals). 
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should theoretically be the same. Any differences would be the result of the 
different methodologies used by each administering agency.  
V. A PATH FORWARD 
China’s status as a non-market economy is a highly contentious issue. 
China strongly contends that the 2001 agreement outlining China’s accession 
to the WTO required other WTO members, including the United States, 
Canada, and the EU, to have granted China a market economy status on 
December 11, 2016.160 For the first fifteen years after the agreement was 
ratified, Article 15 subparagraph (a)(ii) clearly allowed importing nations to 
use a methodology for antidumping duty cases that was “not based on . . . 
domestic prices or costs in China.”161 Sub-paragraph (d)’s language regarding 
what was supposed to happen after fifteen years is the source of the contention. 
U.S. and EU lawyers note that “the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be 
terminated” only “[o]nce China has established, under the national law of the 
importing WTO Member[s] that it is a market economy.”162 As China points 
out, though, the following sentence reads, “[i]n any event, the provisions of 
subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years after the date of accession.”163 When 
read together, the first sentence seems to be stating that, if China proves itself 
to be a market economy before the fifteenth anniversary, then WTO members 
must treat China as a market economy. The second sentence then explains 
what must happen, no matter what, once fifteen years have passed. At that 
point, WTO members must use Chinese domestic prices in their antidumping 
duty calculations. Others interpret the provision differently.164 China feels so 
strongly that its interpretation is correct that it filed disputes in the WTO 
against both the United States and the EU on December 12, 2016.165  
 
 160  World Trade Organization, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China of 10 
November 2001, art. 15, WTO Doc. WT/L/432, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e. 
htm. 
 161  Id. ¶ (a)(ii). 
 162  Id. ¶ (d). 
 163  Id. 
 164  Compare Christian Tietje & Karsten Nowrot, Myth or Reality? China’s Market Economy Status 
under WTO Anti-Dumping Law After 2016, 34 POL’Y PAPERS ON TRANSNAT’L ECON. L. 2, 7 (Dec. 2011) and 
Bernard O’Connor, Market Economy Status for China is Not Automatic, VOX (Nov. 27, 2011), with Helena 
Detlof & Hilda Fridh, The EU Treatment of Non-Market Economy Countries in Anti-Dumping Proceedings, 2 
GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 265, 268 (2007). 
 165  U.S. Set to Review China’s Market-Economy Status Bid, WSJ Says, supra note 3; Request for 
Consultations by China, European Union – Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS516/1 (Dec. 12, 2016). 
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While arguments will continue about the legality of the U.S. and EU 
decisions not to act, the fact remains that President Trump’s rhetoric indicates 
that it is highly unlikely that the U.S. decision will grant China market 
economy status in the near future.166 President Trump’s rhetoric would be 
consistent with the recent EU rejection of a proposal to grant China market 
economy status.167 Considering the control exerted and aid provided by the 
Chinese government in many sectors, this is, at the very least, an easily 
defensible position.168 However, this does not mean that the Commerce 
Department or Congress should not seek to improve the current system.  
The Commerce Department should consider promulgating a rule that sets 
forth a mathematical formula that makes arriving at a surrogate country more 
predictable. In effect, the Commerce Department could apply the 
hypotenuse/distance formula to countries’ GNI per capita and good production 
data to see what country is closest to the NME in question. How similar a 
potential surrogate Nation (“N”) is to an Exporting NME country (“E”) in 
respect to a certain Dumped product (“D”) can be reflected by a similarity 
score (“s-score” or “S”) determined by the following formula where the lower 
the value of S, the more similar E is to N:  
S = √((GE-GN)2+(YE-YN)2) 
In the formula, the G represents each country’s GNI per capita. The Y 
represents the yearly production of comparable merchandise to D for each 
country. Given how extensive the international classification systems already 
are, the term “comparable merchandise” should be defined as merchandise that 
would have the same eight-digit Harmonized Tariff System (HTS) code.  
Because of the vast differences in scale between the GNI per capita 
numbers (G) and the production numbers (Y), for every set of s-score 
calculations made for D and E, the G and Y values would have to be 
normalized to the same scale.169 To provide the desired predictability, the 
normalization process would have to be set as a part of the regulation. I would 
suggest normalizing production and GNI numbers, respectively, according to 
the per country and per capita numbers for the set of countries that individually 
 
 166  Bey, supra note 8. 
 167  Daniela Vincenti, EU Lawmakers Reject Granting China Market Economy Status, EURACTIV 
(May 12, 2016), https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/eu-lawmakers-reject-granting-china-the-
market-economy-status/. 
 168  Bulloch, supra note 3. 
 169  For instance, from the honey example, without normalization, if each countries’ honey production 
were measured in metric tons, the s-scores would be different than if they were all measured in ounces. 
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make up at least 0.2% of the world’s total production. More specifically, I 
would suggest comparing the z-scores generated from the G and Y numbers of 
countries with at least 0.2% of the world’s production.170 The general idea of 
this normalization process is, in effect, to set the scale of the axes on which the 
GNI and production data can be plotted so that their distance from the NME 
country’s information can be measured. Setting a minimum threshold ensures 
that the production of the good is on a scale large enough to justify the 
assumption that the potential surrogate country’s production practices are not 
unreasonably dissimilar from that of the NME country with its much greater 
economies of scale.171 
Having calculated the s-score for all countries meeting the 0.2% threshold, 
the Commerce Department can remove NMEs, countries with information of 
insufficient reliability, and countries with merchandise that may be comparable 
but which the Commerce Department still determines differs from D and the 
values of its factors of production so as to significantly distort the calculation 
of D’s cost of production. Here, the Commerce Department should keep the 
accessibility requirement but add that, unless accompanied by a full translation 
and step-by-step instructions for reproducing the information, data from non-
English websites will be deemed unreliable. 
This method can be summarized as a six-step process. Step 1: Create a list 
consisting of the GNI per capita and amount of goods produced for every 
country. Step 2: Remove all countries whose production is less than 0.2% of 
the world production. Step 3: For the remaining countries, transform their GNI 
per capita and production numbers into z-scores. Step 4: Calculate the s-scores 
from the z-scores. Step 5: Remove any NME country from the list. Step 6: 
Remove countries with unreliable data or data the Commerce Department 
believes are significantly distortive because of differences in factors of 
production. Whatever remaining country has the smallest s-score should be the 
surrogate country. 
To provide a concrete example, the formula can be applied to the 




 170  “A z-score . . . indicates how many standard deviations an element is from the mean.” Z Score, STAT 
TREK, http://stattrek.com/statistics/dictionary.aspx?definition=z%20score (last visited Jan. 23, 2018). 
 171  Setting the minimum threshold would certainly require input during the rulemaking process. 
 172  For a list of other countries’ s-scores, see Table 5 below. 
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Country Honey Production “Y” (tonnes) 
GNI per Capita 
“G” (USD) S-Score 
India 61,945 1,560 .700 
Tanzania 30,905 920 .251 
Romania 18,040 9,600 .452 
Vietnam 14,218 1,900 0 
Australia 13,198 64,860 3.668 
Poland 12,836 13,360 .684 
Uzbekistan 8,751 2,110 .081 
Egypt 5,443 3,250 .151 
Pakistan 4,371 1,390 .147 
Morocco 3,800 3,040 .167 
Nicaragua 560 1,890 
Did not make 
0.2% cutoff 
From the outset, Nicaragua’s red dye clearly does not count as comparable 
merchandise because it would have a different eight-digit HTS code. Without 
the dye, its production did not meet the 0.2% threshold, so it was not included 
in the s-score calculations. Of the countries for which an s-score was 
calculated, Uzbekistan had the lowest, but its status as an NME means it too is 
disqualified.173 Pakistan has the next lowest s-score, so it would be the 
surrogate country, assuming the information did not come from an unreliable 
website and that translations and instructions were included. If not, the 
Commerce Department would instead use Egypt. Because Egypt’s numbers are 
acceptable, the Commerce Department would not have to make a 
determination as to whether it thought that the difference between the 
medicinal honey in Morocco and the edible honey of Vietnam meant that cost 
of labor in Moroccan beehives differed enough from that of Vietnam so as to 
significantly distort the calculation of the cost of producing honey in Vietnam. 
 
 173  See supra note 64; 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4) (2012) requires that the surrogate country be a market 
economy. However, it is preferable to have NMEs remain in the s-score analysis until the very end because of 
how beneficial additional data is to the calculations. More specifically, their inclusion helps make the z-scores 
more accurate by giving additional points to factor into the standard deviation. 
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This same methodology could be applied to determine what the best 
surrogate country would have been for each administrative review of Chinese 
fresh garlic imports discussed above. For example, in the 18th review, the most 
similar countries to China were India, Egypt, and Myanmar.174 No questions 
were raised about the reliability or quality of India’s data, so it would have 
been the surrogate country. 
Given the divisive nature of free trade in today’s political environment, any 
change to the method for calculating antidumping duties could only occur if it 
did not require Congressional action. In fact, adoption of such a framework 
should be possible under the current legislation. As noted above, the Tariff Act 
of 1930 does not set out many rules governing how the Commerce Department 
can select a surrogate country.175 The statute simply mandates that the 
Commerce Department meet three requirements in going about such work. 
First, it must base its determination on “the value of [a good’s] factors of 
production.”176 Second, it must base the valuation of the factors of production 
“on best information available.”177 Third, the Commerce Department must also 
ground the valuation of the factors of production in the NME on the factors’ 
costs in a surrogate country that is “at a level of economic development 
comparable to that of the non-market economy, and significant producers of 
comparable merchandise.”178 The process suggested in this Comment easily 
meets those three requirements; it still uses the (1) best information available 
to calculate the (2) values of the product’s factors of productions, and it relies 
(3) on economic and production information to find a surrogate country. 
Adopting such a process would not only benefit companies by improving 
the predictability of the Commerce Department’s determinations, but could 
also benefit the Department itself. Given the lack of boundaries placed on the 
Commerce Department and the fact that even small changes to the values 
given to the factors of production can cause the results to change dramatically, 
every decision the Department has to make in antidumping duty 
 
 174  These three countries are listed in order of their similarities to China. See Table 6. The data on that 
table comes from two sources: FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/ 
#data/QL (last visited Jan. 23, 2018); GNI per Capita Ranking Atlas Method (Current US$), WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?end=2015&name_desc=false&start=2014 (last visited Jan. 23, 
2018). 
 175  See supra Parts II and III. 
 176  19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1)(B). 
 177  Id. 
 178  19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4). 
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determinations is an act of discretion which must be justified.179 Because of the 
wide discretion it reserves for the Commerce Department, Policy Bulletin 04.1 
is a general statement of policy which the “agency cannot . . . rely upon” to 
justify its decisions.180 When implementing a new process, the Commerce 
Department should strive as much as possible to promulgate actual rules; doing 
so would make explaining the purpose behind its actions much easier.  
How reliable is the United States’ current method for finding a surrogate 
country and ultimately establishing a product’s dumping margin? The 
preceding paragraphs suggest the answer is “not very.” This says much more 
about the immense complexities of the assigned task than anything about the 
Commerce Department’s abilities. It also explains why China is so eager for 
the United States and the EU to start treating it as a market economy for tariff 
purposes. Given the rising tensions between the United States and China over 
trade, adopting the method proposed here would be both a good way to 
demonstrate a willingness to work towards a solution as well as a way to make 





 179  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48–9 (1983) 
(“[A]n agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner.”). 
 180  Unwired Planet, L.L.C. v. Google Inc., 841 F. 3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016); U.S. Magnesium v. 
United States, 31 Ct. Int’l Trade 988, 991 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2007) (“[T]he relevant policy bulletin, while 
meriting “respect,” lacks the force of law to “legally” bind Commerce on its face.”). 
 ∗ Notes and Comments Editor, Emory International Law Review; J.D. Candidate, Emory University 
School of Law (2018); Masters in Middle East Studies, George Washington University (2012); Bachelor of 
Arts, Dartmouth College (2010). The author would like to thank Professor Robert Ahdieh for his advice in 
writing this Comment. The author would also like to thank the Emory International Law Review Executive 
Board for their input throughout the editing and publication process. Finally, the author would like to thank his 
parents for their continuous support. 
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Production S-Score Rank 
China 7,520 462,028 30.59% 6.5747 44 
Turkey 12,590 103,525 6.85% 1.4501 33 
United 
States 55,380 80,862 5.35% 3.2653 42 
Iran 6,530 76,000 5.03% 0.9453 28 
Russia 14,420 74,868 4.96% 1.1502 32 
Ukraine 3,560 66,521 4.40% 0.7730 25 
India 1,560 61,945 4.10% 0.7001 24 
Mexico 10,190 60,624 4.01% 0.8345 26 
Brazil 12,020 38,481 2.55% 0.6886 23 
Canada 51,750 36,993 2.45% 2.9233 41 
Spain 29,290 32,174 2.13% 1.6173 35 
Tanzania 920 30,905 2.05% 0.2513 16 
Angola 4,470 23,434 1.55% 0.2017 10 
South 
Korea 26,800 23,131 1.53% 1.4565 34 
Germany 47,680 20,195 1.34% 2.6685 39 
Uruguay 16,230 19,600 1.30% 0.8386 27 
Romania 9,600 18,040 1.19% 0.4521 19 
New 
Zealand 41,530 17,608 1.17% 2.3093 37 
Hungary 13,460 17,000 1.13% 0.6747 21 
Vietnam 1,900 14,218 0.94% 0.0000 N/A 
Australia 64,860 13,198 0.87% 3.6680 43 
Poland 13,630 12,836 0.85% 0.6837 22 
Taiwan - 11,572 0.77% N/A N/A 
Portugal 21,260 10,451 0.69% 1.1292 31 
United 
Kingdom 43,760 9,546 0.63% 2.4397 38 
Bulgaria 7,720 9,268 0.61% 0.3467 18 
Uzbekistan 2,110 8,751 0.58% 0.0811 1 
Thailand 5,750 8,736 0.58% 0.2383 14 
Cuba - 7,900 0.52% N/A N/A 
Czechia 18,790 7,163 0.47% 0.9894 30 
Croatia 13,150 6,269 0.42% 0.6657 20 
Egypt 3,250 5,443 0.36% 0.1508 3 
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Algeria 5,470 5,425 0.36% 0.2447 15 
Guatemala 3,450 4,893 0.32% 0.1639 7 
Serbia 5,840 4,383 0.29% 0.2711 17 
Pakistan 1,390 4,371 0.29% 0.1474 2 
Georgia 4,490 4,100 0.27% 0.2116 12 
Slovakia 18,110 4,080 0.27% 0.9560 29 
Austria 50,150 3,900 0.26% 2.8150 40 
Moldova 2,560 3,896 0.26% 0.1562 4 
Morocco 3,040 3,800 0.25% 0.1666 9 
Tajikistan 1,340 3,715 0.25% 0.1574 5 
Myanmar 1,240 3,573 0.24% 0.1608 6 
Senegal 1,030 3,467 0.23% 0.1656 8 
Tunisia 4,130 3,300 0.22% 0.2062 11 
Israel 35,680 3,200 0.21% 1.9746 36 
Albania 4,450 3,100 0.21% 0.2206 13 
Nicaragua 1,890 560 0.04% N/A N/A 
The World 7,520 1,510,568 100% N/A N/A 
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GNI Z-Score Garlic Z-Score 
S-
Score 
China 5,060 18,429,500 79.82% 0.364391319 -4.788842714 0 
India 1,380 1,057,800 4.58% 0.682909147 -0.033114597 4.7664 
Egypt 2,520 295,845 1.28% 0.584237863 0.175480464 4.9692 
South Korea 22,540 295,002 1.28% -1.148568362 0.175711246 5.1900 
Russia 11,040 233,948 1.01% -0.153200151 0.192425571 5.0081 
Myanmar 1,020 212,601 0.92% 0.714068499 0.198269589 4.9994 
Bangladesh 870 209,153 0.91% 0.727051563 0.199213523 5.0012 
United 
States 50,460 190,690 0.83% -3.565149271 0.204268009 6.3539 
Ukraine 3,120 171,900 0.74% 0.532305608 0.209412015 5.0011 
Argentina 10,610 145,791 0.63% -0.115982035 0.216559692 5.0284 
Brazil 11,010 143,293 0.62% -0.150603538 0.217243552 5.0325 
Spain 31,140 140,762 0.61% -1.892930676 0.217936446 5.4921 
Uzbekistan 1,530 127,633 0.55% 0.669926083 0.22153068 5.0197 
Ethiopia 390 123,962 0.54% 0.768597366 0.222535664 5.0277 
Peru 4,860 88,468 0.38% 0.38170207 0.232252607 5.0211 
Turkey 11,230 79,203 0.34% -0.169645365 0.234789021 5.0519 
Taiwan -  78,134 0.34% 0.802353332 0.235081673 5.0430 
North Korea - 77,000 0.33% 0.802353332 0.235392121 5.0433 
Thailand 4,950 75,589 0.33% 0.373912232 0.2357784 5.0246 
Iran 6,700 73,910 0.32% 0.222443157 0.236238048 5.0271 
Romania 8,610 66,602 0.29% 0.05712548 0.238238708 5.0365 
Mexico 9,170 58,065 0.25% 0.008655376 0.240575822 5.0420 
Pakistan 1,150 55,308 0.24% 0.702816511 0.241330587 5.0415 
Algeria 4,580 53,981 0.23% 0.405937123 0.24169387 5.0307 
Nepal 600 41,183 0.18%       
Kyrgyzstan 880 30,592 0.13%   
Italy 37,680 30,585 0.13%       
Syria - 30,543 0.13%   
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Sudan 1,480 30,000 0.13%       
Cuba 5,870 26,000 0.11%   
Guatemala 2,850 25,883 0.11%       
Kazakhstan 8,280 23,280 0.10%   
Morocco 3,000 22,376 0.10%       
Tunisia 3,980 21,720 0.09%   
Other 
Countries N/A 321,883 1.39%       
The World N/A 23088185 100%   
 
 
